by A time-tested friend
The inter-governmental agreement (IGA) on nuclear cooperation signed during
the just-concluded visit to Moscow of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh further
cements Russia's role as a vital and trusted partner of India and its civil
nuclear energy programme. Although the details of the agreement have not yet
been made public, Indian officials have confirmed that it provides the basis
for broad cooperation across the full spectrum of the nuclear fuel cycle
without any of the unreasonable conditionalities attaching to nuclear
commerce with the United States. The '123 Agreement,' for example, provides
for lifetime fuel supply guarantees for any American reactors sold to India
but also allows Washington to demand the return of fuel stocks and even
nuclear components in the event that it chooses to terminate cooperation for
any reason. In contrast, the Russian agreement says the termination of
cooperation would be without prejudice to the implementation of ongoing
contracts. The crucial international relations principle involved here is
that there shall be no unilaterally determined disruption of agreed fuel
deliveries. The new IGA also grants India upfront and unqualified consent
rights to reprocess spent Russian fuel so long as this is done under
international safeguards. In contrast, while the 123 text speaks of upfront
consent, the detailed arrangements and procedures, including the conditions
under which the U.S. can suspend this consent, are still being negotiated,
with the deadline only some weeks away.
The Russian willingness to accommodate Indian concerns about fuel supply and
reprocessing is of a piece with Moscow's long-term strategic approach to
nuclear cooperation with India. In 2001, Russia defied the U.S. by supplying
low-enriched uranium to India for use at Tarapur despite being a party to
NSG rules prohibiting this sale. This happened again in 2006, when the U.S.
and India were still working through the fine print of the July 2005 nuclear
deal. Though Russia lacked the confidence and heft to get the NSG to change
its rules, its strong support for the lifting of sanctions allowed India to
extract a better deal from the 45-nation cartel than Washington, and
especially Congress, might like to have seen. Armed with the NSG waiver and
the new IGA, not to speak of the equally advantageous Indo-French agreement,
India knows nuclear cooperation with Russia and France will be more
fruitful, predictable, and secure than what the U.S. offers. As New Delhi
enters the final round of talks with the Obama administration on
reprocessing, it should remind the American side that the more onerous and
unreasonable its demands, the less likely India would be to buy American
reactors. It would be foolish indeed on India's part to commit tens of
billions of dollars on American nuclear equipment if there was even the
slightest chance that fuel supplies or components or reprocessing consent
would be suspended. Least of all when there are better alternatives in hand.