article on touch screen voting machines & how they can't be trusted

article on touch screen voting machines & how they can't be trusted

Post by Shalla » Mon, 11 Nov 2002 07:54:27


I thought this might be of interest as the new non-6.0 scoring system
uses touch screens:

Voting into the void
New touch-screen voting machines may look spiffy, but some experts say
they can't be trusted.
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/11/05/voting_machines/index.htm
l?x

 But as Florida's Sept. 10 primary illustrated, the new systems are
not a panacea -- and, according to Mercuri and a growing number of
tech-savvy critics, the electronic systems are actually worse than
their much-maligned punch-card cousins. Mercuri's chief complaint with
the touch-screen system is that its inner workings are often a
complete secret. When a voter touches the screen to make a choice,
there is no confirmation that the machine has actually registered the
correct selection. In the old punch-card and fill-in-the-circle paper
systems, voters can see their choice marked on paper. And in the event
of a recount, election officials can, as a last resort, manually count
those slips of paper. Since the new electronic systems leave no paper
trail, there's no chance of a recount.

"You can't recount a database," says Jason Kitcat, a computer
scientist who spent many years trying to develop an open-source
Internet voting system. "You can't audit electrons."
{snip}
 But Mercuri and other technologists also offer some harder-to-follow
advice to election officials: Don't buy new touch-screen machines at
all, they say, unless the machines produce some sort of auditable
paper trail. When a voter casts a ballot on a touch-screen machine,
says Mercuri, the machine should spit out a paper version of the
selections, and this paper version should be the "official" ballot,
the one counted and used to determine the outcome of the election.

But Mercuri and other technologists also offer some harder-to-follow
advice to election officials: Don't buy new touch-screen machines at
all, they say, unless the machines produce some sort of auditable
paper trail. When a voter casts a ballot on a touch-screen machine,
says Mercuri, the machine should spit out a paper version of the
selections, and this paper version should be the "official" ballot,
the one counted and used to determine the outcome of the election.

Shallah
~~~
Want to contact ABC & ESPN over FS coverage? Go here:
Ask ABC Sports
http://espn.go.com/abcsports/askabcsports/
ESPN TV
http://espn.go.com/sitetools/s/contact/espntv.html

FS Petition protesting the new scoring system:
Figure Skating's problem is not the scoring system, it is the cheating
of judges and officials
http://www.thepetitionsite.com/takeaction/783533460

 
 
 

article on touch screen voting machines & how they can't be trusted

Post by Trudi Marrapo » Wed, 13 Nov 2002 20:03:16


Quote:

> I thought this might be of interest as the new non-6.0 scoring system
> uses touch screens:

> Voting into the void
> New touch-screen voting machines may look spiffy, but some experts say
> they can't be trusted.
> http://SportToday.org/
> l?x

I didn't know*** Button was writing headlines for Salon. :-)

Quote:
>  But as Florida's Sept. 10 primary illustrated, the new systems are
> not a panacea -- and, according to Mercuri and a growing number of
> tech-savvy critics, the electronic systems are actually worse than
> their much-maligned punch-card cousins. Mercuri's chief complaint with
> the touch-screen system is that its inner workings are often a
> complete secret.

Well, seeing as how the ISU seems to want its own inner workings to be a
complete secret, this might be the perfect technology for them after all.

Quote:
> When a voter touches the screen to make a choice,
> there is no confirmation that the machine has actually registered the
> correct selection. In the old punch-card and fill-in-the-circle paper
> systems, voters can see their choice marked on paper. And in the event
> of a recount, election officials can, as a last resort, manually count
> those slips of paper. Since the new electronic systems leave no paper
> trail, there's no chance of a recount.
> "You can't recount a database," says Jason Kitcat, a computer
> scientist who spent many years trying to develop an open-source
> Internet voting system. "You can't audit electrons."

I'm sorry, but I have to be amused by a scientist named Kitcat...I wonder
if he has coworkers who sing "Gimme a greak, gimme a break" to him...

Quote:
> {snip}
>  But Mercuri and other technologists also offer some harder-to-follow
> advice to election officials: Don't buy new touch-screen machines at
> all, they say, unless the machines produce some sort of auditable
> paper trail. When a voter casts a ballot on a touch-screen machine,
> says Mercuri, the machine should spit out a paper version of the
> selections, and this paper version should be the "official" ballot,
> the one counted and used to determine the outcome of the election.

That would make sense. Probably too much sense for the ISU.
--
Trudi

"On the morning of June 6, 1944,
A lot of German's were dropping to the floor."
--couplet from a D-Day poem written by a high school student